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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
: CASE NO. 9818827-SC 
PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE, 
: PRIORITY NO. 2 
v. (INCARCERATED) 
BRIEN LARSON HOFFHINE, 
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT. 
After carefully reviewing the State's brief and reconsidering his own, counsel for 
Hoffhine maintains all factual and legal positions originally set forth in his Opening Brief 
of Appellant. 
In accordance with rule of appellate procedure 24, in this reply brief, counsel will 
not repeat arguments raised in his opening brief, but will address only those matters not 
already addressed which refute the State's brief. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S ERROR IN 
EXCLUDING THE TERMINOLOGY "EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION," 
BUT ADMITTING FACTS UNDERLYING THE EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION, 
WAS NOT TACTICALLY INVITED BY TRIAL COUNSEL. 
The State claims that this Court should not address the merits of the trial court's 
ruling excluding the terminology "eyewitness identification, but admitting facts 
underlying the eyewitness identification. The State contends that the issue was tactically 
waived by trial counsel and that the error, if any, was invited. See State's brief at 1, 10-
11,12-17. 
This Court should reject the State's argument because it misreads the procedural 
history of this case and the relevant Utah law. 
In claiming that trial counsel waived the issue, the State relies solely on portions of 
trial counsel's statements at what the State characterizes as "a clarifying hearing held 
after the trial court issued its suppression ruling and before trial began." State's brief at 
14. 
The hearing quoted by the State actually occurred on the first day of trial, after the 
jury was selected, and after the trial court had already ruled that the underlying facts 
concerning the identification were admissible. Presumably having selected and prepared 
her witnesses, prepared her cross-examinations, prepared her arguments and having 
selected her jurors for trial in accordance with the trial court's pre-trial ruling, it was 
only at this juncture that trial counsel stated a position consistent with the trial court's 
ruling (R. 407 at 143). 
A painstaking summary of the procedural history of the issue is accurately set forth 
at Point I> Subpoint A of the Opening Brief of Appellant, and demonstrates that the 
erroneous legal analysis originated from the trial court, and differed from the correct 
position originally asserted by trial counsel. See Opening Brief of Appellant at pp. 13-21. 
The States does not distinguish, challenge or mention controlling Utah cases cited 
on page 33 of the Opening Brief of Appellant, indicating that once a party has stated his 
2 
position and the trial court has ruled, the party is not required to except to the ruling of 
the trial court or to renew his motions at trial. See Opening Brief of Appellant at 33 
(citing State v. Nelson, 950 P.2d 940 (Ut. App. 1997); and State v. Saunders, 699 P.2d 
738 (Utah 1985)). 
Instead, the State relies on the invited error line of cases, which involve errors 
originating with the parties who later attempt to complain of them on appeal. See State's 
Brief at 15-17. 
The cases involving invited error are factually distinguishable from the instant one, 
because the errors in those cases originated from the parties trying to raise the errors as 
issues on appeal, and did not originate from the trial courts. See State v. Perdue, 813 
P. 2d 1201, 1205 (Ut. App. 1991)(party may not object on appeal to instruction submitted 
by that party at trial); State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1221 (Utah 1993)(trial counsel's 
failing to inform the trial court of the governing law led the trial court into error); State v. 
Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1285 (Utah 1989)(prosecutor sought to remove juror as a result 
of improper contact between a witness and a juror in capital case, and defense counsel 
indicated that the defendant saw no prejudice and did not wish to raise an issue); Parsons 
v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 520 (Utah)(defendant could not object to the prosecutor's taking 
sworn statements of witnesses, after he had used those statements to his benefit in tne 
trial court); State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 560-61 (Utah 1987)(defendant could not 
object to prosecutor's argument, which was rebuttal to defense counsel's argument), cert, 
denied 513 U.S. 966 (1994); State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 343 (Utah 1997)(declining to 
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reach issue concerning prosecutor's closing argument, when trial counsel made a strategic 
choice not to object); State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155,159 (Utah)(defendant may not 
strategically choose to abstain from objecting to improper evidence at trial, and then raise 
the issue on appeal unless strategy constituted ineffective assistance of counsel), cert. 
denied, 497 U.S. 1024 (1990). 
The two purposes of the invited error doctrine, permitting trial courts to correct 
errors in the first instance, and discouraging parties from leading trial courts into error, 
see, e.g., Dunn, supra, would not be served by applying the doctrine here, where trial 
counsel framed the issue and stated her position correctly and only followed the trial 
court's error once she was in the process of trying the case under the trial court's ruling. 
n. 
HOFFHINE DID NOT PROVIDE THE JURORS WITH 
TWO DIFFERENT VERSIONS OF THE FACTS. 
In arguing that the trial court was correct in declining to arrest judgment for 
insufficient evidence, the State claims that "the jury had before it two versions of 
defendant's whereabouts on the evening of the robbery", identifying the two versions as 
the testimony of Mackenzie Carter that Hoffhine was playing Nintendo with her before 
he left for the evening with Thomas Powell, and the statements that Hoffhine made to the 
police regarding his whereabouts with Thomas Powell on the night of the crime, which 
statements to the police did not refer to Mackenzie Carter or to Nintendo. State's brief at 
22-23. 
In making this argument, the State omits the testimony of its own police officers 
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who interviewed Hoffliine, who testified that they only spoke with Hoffliine very briefly, 
that they did not ask him what he was doing before Powell picked him up, and that when 
Hoffliine spoke with them for the approximate two minutes of their interview HoffHne 
seemed calm, willing to talk, and as though he answered all of their questions to the best 
of his knowledge (R. 408 at 39-40, 46). 
The foregoing testimony confirms that the testimony of Mackenzie Carter was 
consistent with the statements that Hoffliine made to the police. 
While the State argues that the verdict demonstrates that the jury opted to view 
Hoffliine's sequence of events as presented through Mackenzie Carter and the police as 
incredible, State's Brief at 23 n.6, the better explanation for the verdict is that the jurors 
were improperly influenced by the presentation of evidence that Boyadjieff had identified 
Hoffliine as the robber and by the prosecutor's argument that Boyadjieff had identified 
Hoffliine as the robber to within ninety to ninety-five percent certainty (R.407 at 222-23, 
258; R. 408 at 162-64). 
The State complains in footnote 5 of its brief that Hoffhine never explained '\vhy it was 
error for the victim to testify that he was 95 per cent certain of the robber's identity at the show-
up, but throughout all subsequent proceedings, was consistently unsure whether defendant was 
the robber." State's brief at 18 n.5. 
To the extent that Hoflhine's opening brief does not explain the error, but see id. at 34, 
37-38, perhaps the State's brief best sums it up when the State indicates that the trial court ruled 
that "the show-up was unduly suggestive and constitutionally unreliable[.]" State's brief at 7. 
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While Hoffhine is not as certain as the State that this is what the trial court truly 
ruled, see Opening Brief of Appellant at 19-21, the primary error he complains of on 
appeal is that his conviction turned on this constitutionally unreliable evidence. See id. 
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